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A different kind of war? September 11 and 
the United States’ Afghan War 
C O L I N  M C I N N E S *
‘This will be a different kind of conflict against a different kind of enemy’
(President George W. Bush, 15 September 2001)1
Abstract. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the US response have been widely
described as heralding a new kind of war. For over a decade previous to 11 September,
however, a body of literature had developed arguing that during the 1990s a new kind of
warfare had begun to emerge for the West. This article examines whether 11 September and its
immediate aftermath – the US campaign in Afghanistan – confirmed these trends, or whether
it really did constitute a different kind of war. It does so through a four-part framework: that
during the 1990s wars were localised; that the enemy was not a state but a regime or individual
leader; that civilian deaths should be minimised; and that wars were fought on behalf of the
West by professionals, but that the risks to these forces should also be minimised.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 and the US
response have been widely described as heralding a new kind of war.2 For over a
decade previous to 11 September, however, a body of literature was developing
concerning what Martin van Creveld has called ‘the transformation of war’ and
Mary Kaldor ‘new wars’.3 Although this literature is fairly disparate, it is united in
arguing that during the 1990s a new kind of warfare began to emerge (or, for some,
had already emerged). For much of the twentieth century war in the West had been
dominated by the experience and the fear of total war. Even so-called ‘limited wars’
fought by Western powers outside Europe were fought in the shadow of total war.
By the end of the Cold War, however, a consensus was emerging that major war
between Western powers was obsolete and that the era of total war was over.4 The
West still engaged in military operations on a regular basis but their character was
fundamentally different.
What this article addresses is whether 11 September and its immediate aftermath
– the US campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom – confirmed those
trends which were emerging in the 1990s, or whether it really did constitute a
different kind of war. Some caution must be used, not only due to the temporal
proximity to the two events but also in generalising from such a limited base. Not
least it is uncertain how the wider US-led ‘war against terrorism’ will develop.
Nevertheless 11 September and Operation Enduring Freedom can be usefully
compared with the ‘new wars’ of the 1990s. To do this, I adopt a four-point
framework based on key features of Western military operations in the 1990s.5 The
first of these is that wars no longer spread geographically but were localised, not
only in terms of the fighting but in their impact as well. As a result the West
intervened in conflicts without the risk of war spreading to the West itself. NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo, American intervention in Somalia and Haiti, even coalition
operations in the Gulf, did not lead to the war spreading to the West, nor was this
risk seen as a serious possibility. In part the inability of local conflicts to escalate
into more general war was because there was no global conflict into which they
could be subsumed. During the Cold War, local conflicts such as those in the Horn
of Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia acquired global dimensions due to
superpower rivalry. But the lack of a global conflict in the 1990s meant that there
was no wider context for escalation. Wars also lacked escalatory potential due to the
lack of military capabilities. Not only was the United States the sole military
superpower, meaning that any conventional military conflict with it would almost
certainly end in defeat, but few states possessed the capability to launch attacks
outside their own region. The threat of long-range missiles developed by so-called
rogue states was still some way off (nevertheless prompting a revival of interest in
strategic defences), while terrorism appeared confined to the ‘threat within’.
The second element in the transformation of war concerns the nature of the
enemy. In the age of total war the enemy was the opposing state and its people.
Propaganda demonised not only enemy leaders but also enemy soldiers and society
en masse. A ‘literature of atrocity’ appeared with the purpose of dehumanising the
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enemy.6 On the Eastern Front in the Second World War, the Germans en masse were
seen as the enemy by the Soviets; for Germany the Jewish people were to be
eradicated in their entirety; while the willingness of the British to bomb German
cities (and to a lesser extent, German bombing of British cities) suggests that the
people were considered to be the enemy. During the 1990s however, the enemy was
no longer portrayed as the state but as a regime or even an individual leader. The
comments of President Clinton during the Kosovo crisis are typical: ‘Our quarrel is
not with the Serbs in Serbia, it is not with the Serbs in Kosovo, it is not with Serbian
Americans; it is with the leadership who believes it is alright to kill people and to
uproot them and to destroy their family records and to erase any record of their
presence in a land simply because of their ethnic heritage’.7 In Britain, the Foreign
Secretary Robin Cook made a similar point in a message to the Serb people:
‘[NATO’s bombing] is not intended against the Serbian people. It is not intended to
undermine your country . . . our objective has been to strike against the power-base
of President Milosevic . . . I bitterly regret having to enter into conflict with your
country. It started because President Milosevic chose to ignore our warnings and
conduct the most awful cruelty in Kosovo. It can end when he calls a halt to that
cruelty, and lets the people of Kosovo, and the people of Yugoslavia, have the
peaceful and prosperous future they deserve.’8 In this shift from counter-state to
counter-regime, Western politicians explicitly distance themselves from presenting
the people – Serbs, Somalis, Iraqis or whomever – as the enemy. Indeed the people
are often presented as suffering under a repressive regime. The target therefore is not
the state but the leadership, what it values and its ability to maintain a grip on
power.
Third, and closely related to this, was the attempt to minimise collateral damage.
Considerable efforts were made to avoid causing collateral damage, efforts which
were much publicised by Western leaders. US Secretary of Defense William Cohen
commented about the 1998 air strikes against Iraq, for example, that ‘We’ve taken
great care to minimize casualties amongst innocent civilians in our strikes. . . . To the
extent that there are civilian casualties, only Saddam and his brutally destructive
regime are to blame’.9 After the first night of NATO bombing in the Kosovo
conflict, Prime Minister Tony Blair reported ‘we have done everything we can to
minimise civilian damage.’10 Despite the effort given over to minimising collateral
damage, mistakes still occurred. The strong reaction to such mistakes was in part
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due to raised expectations – that when the rhetoric of precision was coupled to
powerful images of bombs hitting targets with unnerving accuracy, an expectation
developed that collateral damage should not occur. This however can only be a
partial explanation. After all, it was not the West that suffered from collateral
damage but the enemy. Part of the explanation therefore has to do with the changed
identification of the enemy. If the enemy was no longer the people but a regime or
leadership, then bombs that missed did not hit the ‘enemy’ but innocent civilians. In
the Second World War there were few qualms about causing collateral damage
because ultimately it was still the enemy that suffered. But when bombs missed their
targets in Belgrade or Baghdad in the 1990s, it was the innocent and the vulnerable
that suffered. Another part of the explanation is that a tacit bargain had been struck
whereby, if the enemy population was no longer targeted then Western society
similarly should not be placed at risk. If the West attacked civilian targets or caused
collateral damage, then this might have made Western society a legitimate target;
such actions would have invited retaliation in kind. But by avoiding enemy civilians
and by minimising collateral damage, the West may have been encouraging, con-
sciously or not, the enemy to reciprocate and create a norm of non-combatant
immunity.11
Finally, if society participated in war during the age of total war, then in these new
wars it had no such desire. Instead society spectated. Wars were no longer fought by
nations in arms, rather they were fought by representatives on the field of battle. War
was no longer an obligation of citizenship but the business of professionals. Those
involved had chosen to be so through a career choice and accepted unlimited liability
as part of their professional contract. By making war the business of professionals,
Western societies absolved themselves from some of the responsibility of placing them
in harm’s way. For those involved, war was their chosen occupation and death and
injury an occupational hazard. The social contract that formed part of Clausewitz’s
trinitarian perspective on war was replaced by a business relationship.12 The costs of
war were also reduced by the comparatively small numbers involved, usually a few
thousand.13 Wars were fought by a small fraction of the West, limiting not only
exposure to suffering but also the sense of participation and shared endeavour. But
even though the numbers involved were small the political impact of casualties might
nevertheless be considerable: the military may be our representatives, but they are our
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representatives. In Bosnia and Somalia each American soldier was politically
significant and as a consequence their exposure to risk was also minimised.14
September 11
At 08.45 local time on 11 September 2001, a hijacked American Airlines passenger
jet was flown into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.
Eighteen minutes later a second hijacked aircraft was flown into the south tower.
Just under an hour after the first attack, a third hijacked aircraft was flown into the
Pentagon in Washington DC causing part of it to collapse. At 10.05 the south tower
of the World Trade Center collapsed, followed at 10.28 by the north. At 10.10 a
fourth hijacked aircraft crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, south of
Pittsburgh.15 It was immediately apparent that the death toll from these concerted
attacks would be high, the shock compounded by the fact that the vast majority
would be ordinary citizens working in two of the West’s major cities. The peculiarly
evocative images – of a clear blue sky, gleaming aircraft, white buildings, the black
smoke and red fireballs from impact; of the almost graceful collapse of both towers;
of the survivors, some barely recognisable as human beings, emerging from the
devastation; of the cloud of dust and debris obscuring the lower half of Manhattan
– were transmitted globally by a media quickly on the scene. Almost as evocative
was the rhetoric that followed, not least the analogies with Pearl Harbor, suggesting
a fundamental transformation in American foreign policy as well as in the nature of
threats faced by the United States.16
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To a certain extent such attacks had been presaged. In 2000 the US National
Commission on Terrorism had reported that ‘Today’s terrorists seek to inflict mass
casualties, and they are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil’.17
In April 2001, the US State Department began its report Patterns of Global
Terrorism by arguing that ‘terrorism continues to pose a clear and present danger to
the international community’.18 Both reports cited the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
as a sponsor of terrorism, while the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism
report specifically mentioned Osama bin Laden.19 Prior to 11 September, at least one
FBI agent had raised concerns over Middle Eastern enrolments at US flight schools
and just weeks before 11 September the President himself received a briefing on the
possibility of an imminent attack.20 Attacks against US targets were also hardly
new, particularly the 1998 attacks against embassies in east Africa (which killed 224
people, including 12 Americans, and injured perhaps 5,000 more), the 12 October
2000 attack against the USS Cole (which killed 17 US sailors) and the thwarted
attack over the Millennium. Nor was the attempted hijacking of US aircraft new –
in 1995 a conspiracy to hijack eleven US aircraft simultaneously over the Pacific had
also been thwarted. Most tellingly the World Trade Center had itself been a target of
terrorist attack in 1993, with six killed and over a thousand wounded.21 To a certain
extent, what was surprising on 11 September 2001 was the means used – the
National Commission on Terrorism for example had identified a number of possible
means of terrorist attack including bio-terrorism and cyber attacks, but not hijacked
aircraft being flown into landmark buildings.22 But perhaps most shocking was the
combination of the scale of the loss of civilian life, the fact that this was
accomplished in the West itself (and particularly in the United States) and the live
television coverage – on 11 September most of the world became spectators of
terrorism.
Was this war? Initially there was confusion within the Bush Administration over
whether the attacks constituted an act of war. US Attorney General Ashcroft on 11
September talked of bringing ‘the people responsible for these acts, these crimes, to
justice.’23 On the same day Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, asked if he considered
the attacks to be acts of war, replied ‘What words the lawyers will use to characterize
it is for them’.24 In his address to the nation that evening, however, the President
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lawyer who had doubts over whether this was war was Marcel Berlins in his weekly column for the
Guardian, 18 September 2001.
talked of ‘the war against terrorism’.25 The next day he referred to the attacks as acts
of war,26 a message repeated in his address to the Joint Session of Congress on 20
September.27 Speaking on 14 September in the House of Commons, the Prime
Minister appeared somewhat more circumspect, couching the act in criminal terms
and talking of ‘bringing those responsible to account’.28 But over the weekend, in an
interview with CNN, he too talked of war: ‘the fact is that we are at war with
terrorism . . . it is a war, if you like, between the civilised world and fanaticism’.29
September 11 and the transformation of war
The events of 11 September were shocking in part because they appeared to break
the pattern of war established by the West in the 1990s. In the previous decade, war
had become something conducted at a safe distance. But on 11 September the
attacks were at the heart of the West, against the capital of the United States and
against one of its most famous and most visited cities. The President told Congress
on 20 September, ‘Our Nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from
attack’.30 A new sense of vulnerability emerged,31 apparent in the reaction to the
anthrax attacks a few weeks later, and quickly led to a range of homeland defence
measures including the creation of the Office of Homeland Security under Governor
Tom Ridge and a $20bn package of measures to promote homeland security.32 Nor
was this seen as simply an attack on the United States. Not only were citizens of
over 80 other nations killed in the attacks of 11 September,33 but the attacks were
portrayed more broadly as attacks upon ‘the free world’, or more usually ‘the
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p. 3.
33 ‘The Global War on Terrorism’, p. 3.
civilised world’.34 The implication was clear – it was not simply the United States
which was now vulnerable and which might be attacked on its own soil.
If the West’s wars in the 1990s had been localised and fought away from the West,
then they had also been portrayed as wars against regimes or leaders. Targeting
policies had accordingly attempted to minimise civilian deaths, particularly collateral
damage. In some senses the attacks of 11 September were also against leadership
targets: they were against the United States, the leader of the free world; two of the
aircraft were targeted at symbols of US global financial leadership; and one aircraft
was targeted at the headquarters of the US military. But this was not discriminate
targeting against regimes; it was indiscriminate, with no attempt to minimise civilian
deaths. In his 1998 fatwa, Osama bin Laden had stated that ‘The ruling to kill the
Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it’.35 Nor did the
attacks appear to be geared to the downfall of a regime – the target was at best US
‘leadership’ in a vague sense. Conceivably the downfall of the West was an aim, but
this remained unclear. Osama bin Laden’s fatwa, for example, had called for more
specific goals relating to Islam’s holy sites as well as the more general injunction that
the enemies of Islam be rendered unable to threaten Muslims.36
September 11 also departed from the pattern of warfare established by the West
in terms of collateral damage. Whereas the West had taken great pains to avoid
unnecessary civilian deaths – albeit not always successfully – the terrorist attacks
either did not accept any distinction between legitimate targets and collateral
damage, or did not care about it. As the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman,
Alastair Campbell, bluntly put it: ‘These people had no regard for human life’.37
Nick Wheeler has written, ‘What shocked the world about the events of September
11 was that the perpetrators of this act deliberately set out to kill innocent
civilians’.38 This stood in stark contrast to the manner in which the West had
presented its campaigns in the late 1990s, when efforts had been made to minimise
civilian suffering and both President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair had
apologised for the suffering which had occurred.39 Almost a year after the attacks of
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11 September, however, estimates of those killed ran at 3,062, the overwhelming
majority of them civilians.40 According to official US sources, approximately 2,000
children lost a parent on 11 September; one business alone lost 700 civilian employees,
leaving 50 pregnant widows.41 Francois Heisbourg was not alone in wondering what
the purpose of this was – for Heisbourg, the attacks were ‘not political in the Clause-
witzian sense’.42 This instead appeared to be some new form of warfare which passed
not only traditional understandings of instrumental force, but acceptable norms of
conduct in war. Adam Roberts concluded that ‘The attacks of 11 September should be
regarded as falling within the legal category of “crimes against humanity”, which
encompasses widespread or systematic murder against any civilian population’.43
The final area of change concerned the risk to Western society. The wars of the
1990s had presented virtually no direct risk to the majority of Western society. But on
11 September that all changed. Suffering was not limited to those directly involved
but spread thoughout the United States. As Secretary of Health Thompson put it,
‘Every single American lost something today . . . America and all of its citizens share
tonight in the grief that has been caused.’44 Perhaps most revealing was the sense that
life as normal had been interrupted by a new form of insecurity. Although the
President attempted to reassure the American people on 11 September that the US
was still ‘open for business’,45 the next day he stated that ‘it is not business as usual’.46
In his address to the Joint Session of Congress on 20 September, President Bush was
aware that life had not returned to normal and showed no signs of doing so quickly:
‘It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to
normal’.47 There is a strong sense that society had been directly affected by the events
of 11 September. The majority of Americans may have been spectators to the events
on the day itself, but they participated in the suffering. These terrorist acts created not
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only spectacular images but also rendered the West empathic spectators – that in
watching the destruction, the citizens of the West were made aware of their vulner-
ability to subsequent acts. The attacks on the World Trade Center in particular
produced feelings of empathy: these were ordinary citizens working in one of the
most famous buildings of one of the most visited cities of the West. Being a spectator
was used by the terrorists not to distance the citizens of the West from the attacks,
but to bring them closer.
Does this mean that 11 September changed war for the West? There are three
possible reasons why it did not. First, the attacks on 11 September were not carried
out by the West but by its enemies. Therefore although the experience of that day may
have been different for those living in the West from, for example, the war in Kosovo,
it tells us little about how the West will conduct subsequent military operations. This
is the focus of the section below. Second, the outrage over 11 September suggests the
potency of the framework outlined above. Just as not all wars in the age of total war
were ‘total’,48 so not all wars in the current age need conform fully to the framework;
but when they do not, and in such an extreme manner, then the reaction may be one
of outrage. Thus Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida were quickly portrayed as evil
precisely because they did not conform to Western ideas of how war should be
fought: in rather simplistic terms, it was a case of ‘bad guys cheat’, or of not fighting
fair. The worldwide, near universal condemnation which followed the attacks
suggested that norms had been broken and that there was a desire to maintain these
not dispense with them. Thirdly, 11 September has been described as an ‘asymmetric’
attack.49 This form of warfare attempts to deny the enemy a war fought along its
preferred lines, offering instead challenges and situations which it finds uncomfortable
or unfamiliar. It is often a strategy of the weak against the strong, where they exploit
what few advantages they have to create something unexpected to which an enemy
has difficulty responding. US strategic preferences are not simply for a Gulf War-type
conflict – of a ‘proper’ war involving large scale operations against regular forces in a
defined theatre of war, where overwhelming US material superiority can be brought
to bear;50 more broadly it is for the sort of war identified above, fought away from the
West against regimes, not affecting Western societies and causing minimal loss of life.
September 11 was an asymmetric attack because it was a negative image of the
framework discussed above. The pattern of war developed by the West set the agenda
for asymmetric attacks against the West.
The Afghan campaign: Operation Enduring Freedom
The US military response to 11 September began on 7 October 2001. The aims of
the campaign in Afghanistan were initially unclear. Two distinct options emerged.
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The first involved punishing the Taliban for harbouring and collaborating with al-
Qaida and was intended to coerce the regime into bringing those involved to
justice.51 The second was to topple the Taliban regime and open up the way for an
alternative government that would allow the US direct access to al-Qaida hideouts in
Afghanistan. By the eve of the campaign, the Taliban’s failure to cooperate with US
demands had effectively undermined the first option and the US appeared to be
seeking the removal of the regime, both as an act of punishment but also as a
deterrent to other states harbouring terrorists.52 Planning began when Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld ordered on 12 September the preparation of ‘credible military
options’ to respond to international terrorism. Key to this was US Central
Command under General Tommy R. Franks, which was tasked with preparing a
warplan for operations in Afghanistan. Franks’ concept of operations was presented
to President Bush on 21 September and reflected very much the regime removal
option: it proposed that ‘US Central Command . . . would destroy the Al Qaida (sic)
network inside Afghanistan along with the illegitimate Taliban regime which was
protecting and harbouring the terrorists.’53 More detailed plans for combat
operations, including target sets and force requirements, were presented to Secretary
Rumsfeld on 1 October and were authorised by the President the next day. The plan
involved ‘multiple lines of operation’ to be conducted simultaneously rather than
sequentially and included targeting the leadership of al-Qaida and the Taliban,
attacking the Taliban military, and delivering humanitarian aid. Crucially, Franks’
strategy was to avoid ‘invading’ Afghanistan and to work with rather than against
the people – though the extent of such cooperation in the initial stages of the
campaign was not obviously great.54 Although US ground troops were inserted early
on, these were limited in number and drawn from special forces. Operating with the
opposition United Front (or ‘Northern Alliance’), their role appeared primarily to
be one of intelligence gathering and targeting precision-guided munitions launched
from US aircraft. A larger ground presence would not only have been problematic
given the lack of host nation support in the region (both Muslim Pakistan and the
former Soviet republics neighbouring Afghanistan would have had substantial
political problems in acting as a base for a US ground force), but for fears of a
protracted involvement similar to that following the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion.55
The operation began with air strikes against selected military targets and
expanded to include strikes against political and infrastructure targets as well as al-
Qaida bases. Air strikes were complemented by special forces operations and an
ambitious raid by US ground forces against the Kandahar compound of the
Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar. US strategy appeared to be attempting to split the
already divided Taliban both by strategic strikes and also by affecting its military
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capabilities, most particularly in the north against the United Front.56 By the end of
October, however, little appeared to have been achieved. Critics of the campaign
became increasingly vocal: the United Front had failed to take the key northern
town of Mazar-e Sharif; Taliban support appeared strong in both Afghanistan and
areas of neighbouring Pakistan; and a number of targeting mistakes had led to
questions over the conduct of the campaign. Although in retrospect the Taliban was
under increasing pressure, caught between maintaining its military front in the north
and retaining control elsewhere in Afghanistan, the impression elsewhere was of a
campaign getting nowhere fast.57 It was in this context that in the final week of
October, US strategy shifted towards one of ‘brute force’.58 B-52 bombers began
carpet-bombing Taliban positions in support of United Front ground operations. In
November the air attacks intensified, on 7 November reaching 120 attack sorties a
day.59 The sudden collapse of the Taliban, however, was largely unexpected.60 On 9
November the key northern town of Mazar-e Sharif fell to United Front troops. The
Taliban attempted to retreat south to the source of their political power in the
Kandahar region. Command and control however broke down catastrophically and
the retreat became a rout, characterised by a succession of defections. On 12
November United Front forces broke onto the Shomali Plain and the next day
entered the capital, Kabul. After an agreement signed in Bonn on 5 December, an
interim authority was established under Hamid Karzai, and on 20 December UN
Security Council Resolution 1386 authorised the establishment of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under British command. The Taliban attempted to
make a stand in Kandahar, but abandoned its home base there on 7 December. A
week later US Marine Corps armoured troops moved in to establish control of the
airport. The collapse of the Taliban was probably a result of a number of factors,
not least the synergy between US air power and United Front ground offensives. But
the inherent weaknesses of the Taliban regime also probably played a part. The
Taliban was a loose coalition that had failed to grow out of its regional roots. As a
result it found itself overextended, lacking popular support and prone to division.
When placed under pressure, it began to collapse within itself. It then decided to fall
back and regroup around Kandahar. This proved to be a strategic error. Adopting a
positional defence made it vulnerable to US air power, while it misjudged the US
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political aims in hoping for some form of accommodation. The US by now was
interested in nothing short of the total overthrow of the Taliban. It was only with
the fall of Kandahar that the Taliban fell back on the strategy it was best equipped
for and the US least able to deal with, one of guerrilla warfare.61
With the collapse of Taliban resistance in Kandahar and the establishment of an
interim authority in Kabul, most of Afghanistan entered a period of post-conflict
reconstruction. For the United States, however, the conflict remained though its
nature had changed. General Franks described the mission as now being to ‘locate
and destroy remaining pockets of Taliban and Al Qaida (sic) fighters and to search
for surviving leadership’.62 For Franks, much work still needed to be done and some
of it very dangerous.63 This resulted in some tension between the Afghans and the
United States, especially over continued aerial bombardment. It also led to some
instances of US air power being misled by local intelligence and used by warlords to
settle old scores.64 The overall pattern which emerged however was described by
Franks as one of a general low level of activity with occasional ‘spikes’ of more
intense activity.65 US ground forces began to play an increasingly significant role in
combat operations, including a pitched battle in mid-December at Tora Bora south
of Jalalabad.66 More significant however was Operation Anaconda which began on
2 March in a 70 square mile rough, mountainous area of the Paktia province around
Shah-I-Kot. The operation involved around 2,000 coalition ground troops, including
800–900 Americans, against Taliban and al-Qaida forces estimated as several
hundred strong. Franks described the close-quarter fighting as ‘very scary’, not
helped by the difficult conditions, and a number of American soldiers were killed in
the fighting.67 Although there was some speculation that the United States had
allowed Taliban and al-Qaida fighters to gather there so that they could conduct a
single decisive battle rather than a series of smaller ‘cat and mouse chases’,68 subse-
quent operations (including Operation Snipe beginning on April 29 and Operation
Condor in May 200269) suggested that this phase of the conflict was still far from
over. Nevertheless in the first three months of Operation Enduring Freedom the
United States had succeeded in removing the Taliban regime from power; al-Qaida
activities had been severely disrupted, though the organisation had not been
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destroyed; it had lost the ability to operate out of a friendly state and at least 11
training camps as well as other facilities in Afghanistan; at least eight of the top al-
Qaida leaders were believed dead, although both Osama bin Laden and the Taliban
leader Mullah Omar were probably still alive and on the run; and some 3,000–4,000
Taliban troops had been killed along with several hundred ‘Afghan Arabs’ associated
with al-Qaida.70
The war in Afghanistan: back to the future
The conduct and experience of Operation Enduring Freedom bore many of the
hallmarks of Western military operations from the 1990s. Not least, the war was
fought in Afghanistan with no direct engagement by Western society at large. In
three important respects, however, Enduring Freedom was not as localised as
previous Western military operations. First, not only were some of the bombing
missions flown from bases in the continental United States (as had been the case in
Kosovo71), but the operation was commanded and controlled from CENTCOM’s
base in Tampa, Florida. During Operation Desert Storm, Frank’s predecessor
General Norman Schwarzkopf had been based in Saudi Arabia; but for Afghanistan
operations were controlled at arms length from within the United States.72 This was
partly due to the smaller footprint involved, but also a result of advances in
technology which allowed Franks not only to video-teleconference with local
commanders, but to ‘see’ the battlefield with ‘unparalleled situational awareness’.73
Second, the US appeared committed to widening the war to a more general attack
on terrorism and states supporting terrorists. In his 29 January 2002 State of the
Union Address, President Bush stated that ‘Our second goal [in the war against
terror] is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our
friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction’. The President went on to
explicitly identify Iran, Iraq and North Korea as constituting ‘an axis of evil’.74
Implicit was the threat that military actions might be considered against these states.
A few days earlier, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had been even more explicit: ‘if
we have to go into 15 more countries, we ought to do it’.75 Third, a real fear
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remained that 11 September would not be the last attack on American soil. In May
2002, Vice-President Dick Cheney gave a high profile warning that another terrorist
attack was ‘almost certain’.76 At the time Cheney was almost certainly aware of the
arrest of Abdullah al-Muhajir on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack in the
United States using a ‘dirty bomb’, an arrest only made public in June.77 Therefore
although conventional military operations might be fought elsewhere, asymmetric
attacks could be conducted against the United States itself, as well as its allies.
Importantly, whereas asymmetric responses in previous conflicts were limited to the
theatre of operations (such as the use of Western hostages as a ‘human shield’ and
the release of oil into the Persian Gulf by Saddam during the Gulf War, and ethnic
cleansing prompting a mass exodus in Kosovo by the Milosevic regime78), after 11
September this no longer appears to be the case.
Operation Enduring Freedom was also similar to operations of the 1990s in that
the enemy was couched in terms of a regime (and, in this instance, the terrorists it
harboured) rather than the state and the people. Thus the debate over campaign
objectives was whether to coerce or remove the regime in Afghanistan,79 while
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic emphasised that the enemy was not the Afghan
people but the Taliban regime and al-Qaida.80 As with previous operations the
Western narrative was of a people oppressed by a regime, and it was that regime
which was the target of military operations. Thus President Bush stated to the Joint
Session of Congress that ‘America is a friend of the Afghan people’,81 while General
Franks talked of ‘America’s compassion for the suffering Afghan people’.82 In case
anyone was in any doubt of the oppressed nature of the Afghan people, the
Administration detailed how ‘Afghanistan’s people have been brutalized’.83 As Nick
Wheeler has pointed out however, there were limits to this compassion: the
humanitarian aid dropped at the beginning of the campaign was dismissed by aid
workers as a propaganda stunt; the US was unwilling to commit to ISAF despite the
wishes of the interim authority; and warlords amongst the United Front allies were
reported as being responsible for human rights abuses against Pashtun civilians in
the north.84 Such limits had of course been seen in previous Western interventions,
most recently in the unwillingness of NATO to commit to an opposed ground entry
in Kosovo, and the height at which NATO aircraft operated in that conflict in order
to avoid the risk from hand-held SAMs. What matters here though, is that the
narrative of oppression is much the same as for previous operations and that the
campaign objectives and enemy imaging were couched in terms of the regime rather
than the Afghan people.
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A third area of similarity concerned the attention paid to minimising collateral
damage. General Franks has repeatedly asserted that ‘this has been the most accurate
war ever fought in this nation’s history’.85 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld went
further: ‘no nation in human history has done more to avoid civilian casualties than
the United States has in this conflict’.86 To ensure this low level of civilian deaths, not
only was a very high proportion of precision-guided munitions used87 but there was
also tight control over the targeting process such that some Air Force commanders
became frustrated that concerns over civilian casualties were hindering military
operations.88 Nevertheless Carl Connetta estimated that the campaign ‘directly
claimed the lives of 1,000 Afghan civilians, probably added more than another 3,000
deaths to the toll of the country’s humanitarian crisis, and certainly produced 500,000
new refugees and displaced persons.’89 Deliveries of aid and food were also disrupted
at the local level for two to three months in late 2001, causing further suffering.90
Indeed Connetta argues that the rate of civilians killed per bomb dropped was higher
than in Kosovo.91 Higher estimates of civilian deaths released by the Taliban regime
were quickly discounted as unreliable, though those produced by the US academic
Marc Herold received considerably more attention. Herold claimed that up to 4,000
Afghan civilians had been killed by US bombing raids between 7 October 2001 and 1
January 2002, and that the US ‘directly targeted certain civilian facilities deemed
hostile to its war intent’.92 Although Herold’s data has been criticised as lacking in
rigour,93 it is nevertheless clear that a substantial number of Afghans died as a result
of US bombing raids, not least in a series of high profile ‘mistakes’. These included
the bombing of a UN de-mining facility, an attack on a Red Cross food convoy and
the double bombing of a Red Cross food distribution centre. Nor did controversy end
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with the fall of Kabul: on 29 December an attack purportedly on Taliban and al-
Qaida leaders in the village of Qalai Niazi killed up to 107 villagers; a convoy of
tribal elders en route from Paktia to the inauguration of the interim authority were
mistakenly attacked by US aircraft, killing up to 65; on 1 July, during Operation Full
Throttle, 48 civilians were killed and 117 wounded in attacks on villages in the home
province of Mullah Omar.94 Attacks such as these prompted expressions of concern
from within Afghanistan, including from some within the new government, as well as
from US allies in the coalition.95 In response to these criticisms the Bush Administra-
tion deployed several arguments: that some civilian deaths were inevitable in war,
though regrettable, but that the US had worked harder than any previous belligerent
to minimise such deaths; that the Taliban deliberately placed civilians at risk by
deploying military assets in civilian buildings, including mosques and by using
villages as human shields; that leadership targets and in particular al-Qaida targets
were often located in residential areas making collateral damage more likely; and that
ultimate responsibility for civilian deaths lay not with the US but with those who
started the war.96 Additional, less readily acknowledged reasons may have included
the particular weapons and aircraft used being less accurate than in Kosovo; the poor
and unreliable nature of some of the intelligence; the problem of how to respond
rapidly but with certainty to targets of opportunity (particularly once the Taliban
were on the run and became intermingled with refugee flows); and difficulties in
targeting small groups of guerrilla fighters mingling with the civilian population.97
Some remained unconvinced that the United States had done enough to meet some
of the more stringent criteria for a ‘just’ or ‘humanitarian’ war;98 nevertheless it is
clear that the rhetoric emphasised a concern over minimising civilian casualties, that a
major attempt had been made to limit non-combatant deaths, and that Connetta’s
figure of 1,000 to 1,300 accidental civilian deaths in the first few months stands in
stark contrast not only to the deliberate targeting of civilians on 11 September, but to
civilian deaths in the era of total war.99
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Finally, Operation Enduring Freedom also demonstrated a high level of concern
for the lives of coalition, and particularly US service personnel. That this would be
the case was not necessarily immediately apparent from the initial bravado of
Administration officials. After meeting his top national security advisers at Camp
David on 15 September, President Bush stated ‘The United States will do what it
takes to win this war’. Attorney General Ashcroft echoed these sentiments: ‘we’re
going to get them, no matter what it takes’.100 Two days later at the Pentagon, the
bullish mood was still with the President, stating that the US was ‘ready to defend
freedom at any cost’.101 But four months on Congress was praising General Franks
for the low loss of life in Afghanistan.102 Indeed by early January only two US
service personnel had lost their lives due to enemy fire (one of whom was a CIA
operative);103 and although the loss of life began to increase as the US became more
directly involved in ground operations, the rate of increase was still slow.104 Central
to this was General Franks’ decision not to invade Afghanistan but to rely on the
combination of US air power and United Front ground forces, supported by limited
numbers of coalition special forces on the ground.
Finding willing local allies appeared to be developing as a feature of US
operations, allowing fewer US forces to be placed in exposed and dangerous
situations on the ground. As a number of commentators have pointed out, the
precedent for cooperation with the United Front lay with the KLA in Kosovo.105
The parallel however is not exact. In particular, NATO’s relationship with the KLA
was at best at arms length, whereas in Afghanistan the US coordinated its
operations with the United Front. The United Front had a status which the KLA
never enjoyed and became an integral element of US strategy in Afghanistan.106
More important for the general point, however, is that it is not clear that reliance on
local ground forces was a preferred strategic option. The initial degree of
coordination between the US and the United Front was quite limited and it was only
with the change in strategy to one of brute force in late October 2001 that closer air-
ground coordination appeared, with US air power directly and consistently
supporting United Front ground operations. Further, despite the success of a
coordinated strategy in overthrowing the Taliban, relying on local allies had also
produced problems. The United Front’s rush to take Kabul had been against US
wishes, and reflected the degree to which local interests may override those of the
US. In the attack on Tora Bora, local Afghan forces had performed poorly, allowing
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al-Qaida fighters to escape and appearing unwilling to risk their own lives for US
interests. By Operation Anaconda the US had learnt the lesson that there are limits
on the extent to which local ground forces can be used in support of US operations.
Their political agenda may be different and their combat motivation lacking. For
Anaconda, the US preferred to use their own troops despite the increased risk,
suggesting that the strategy of using local ground forces in coordination with US air
power may have only limited application.
By the end of the 2001 over 3,000 US troops were on the ground in Afghanistan,
mostly special forces, and their role was being hailed as a major element in the
coalition’s success.107 Moreover, as the guerrilla phase developed major US combat
formations were deployed on the ground in Afghanistan, including elements of 10th
Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division, and combat operations involving a
thousand or more troops began to occur. Nevertheless the ground commitment was
limited in comparison with both the Gulf War and, to take a guerrilla campaign
from a previous age, Vietnam. The number of US service personnel placed in harm’s
way was comparatively small; US ground forces were ‘not going to be an occupation
army’; nor were they willing to play a role in ISAF.108
Conclusion 
The US conduct of operations in Afghanistan demonstrated many similarities with
operations from the previous decade. Not least, the war was localised in Afghanistan;
the enemy was identified as the Taliban regime and the al-Qaida terrorist organis-
ation, with the Afghan people portrayed as suffering under an oppressive regime;
there were significant efforts to minimise collateral damage; and US casualties were
kept low. Although the US did deploy ground forces into Afghanistan, running a
heightened risk of casualties, this was only done in significant numbers when the
Taliban had been beaten and when air power alone could not deal with the
remaining enemy forces. Even then numbers involved were a few thousand and
therefore on a similar scale to those deployed in the Balkans, not the tens of
thousands in the Gulf War or Vietnam. An important qualification, however,
concerns the localisation of the war. Although Operation Enduring Freedom was
limited to Afghanistan, the ‘war on terror’ holds the possibility of spreading in two
important respects. First, US officials have repeatedly made the point that Afghanistan
was not the only state harbouring terrorists and that subsequent operations against
other states are possible. Second, further terrorist attacks by al-Qaida within the
United States in retaliation for US attacks in Afghanistan are possible – as the May
2002 arrest of Abdullah al-Mujahir on suspicion of planning a ‘dirty bomb’ attack,
and the heightened security surrounding the first anniversary of the terrorist attacks
suggests. This represents a very different form of asymmetric warfare from that seen
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in Kosovo or the Gulf War and one which would clearly not be localised to the
region.
Whereas the campaign in Afghanistan bore many similarities with Western
military operations from the previous decade, 11 September initially appears to be
very different. In particular the fact that the attacks were conducted in the United
States itself and deliberately targeted against civilians made the attack different not
only from the conflicts of the 1990s but from recent terrorist attacks as well (most
notably the bombings of the East Africa embassies and the attack on the USS Cole).
But in two important respects 11 September does demonstrate continuity with the
new wars of the 1990s. First, 11 September constitutes an asymmetric attack that
reflects a negative image of the type of war fought by the West. In other words, the
pattern or character of war established by the West in the 1990s provides a basis for
understanding the asymmetric attack of 11 September. It is not that the pattern has
been undermined; rather it has been reversed, much as the term ‘asymmetry’ might
suggest. Second, 11 September was not the first terrorist attack to be attempted
against large numbers of US civilians: the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center,
the 1995 attempt to hijack passenger jets over the Pacific and the thwarted attack
over the millennium all predated 11 September. The difference was that on 11
September the plan worked. The idea of US invulnerability in the post-Cold War
world had been a myth which was shattered on 11 September. But the failure of
previous attacks should not obscure the fact that US civilians were targets in the
1990s; and just as these attacks did not invalidate ideas concerning the
transformation of war, nor does 11 September.
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